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Carte Blanche:  Federal Prosecution of State and  
Local Officials after Sabri 
 
 George D. Brown* 
 
Introduction 
 
 In July of 2004, the State of Maryland was rocked by a political controversy that 
reached the highest levels of the federal Department of Justice.  In a front page story, the 
Baltimore Sun revealed that the United States Attorney for Maryland, Thomas 
DiBiaggio, had told his staff that he wanted three “front page” white collar or public 
corruption indictments by November 6.1  Since that date is election day, critics were 
quick to change him with politicizing the investigation and prosecution of public 
corruption cases.2  The Washington Post thundered that he had “given the appearance of 
an excessive, irresponsible prosecutorial zeal to bring down prominent officials 
regardless of the evidence.”3  In an extraordinary rebuke, the Department of Justice made 
public a letter from the Deputy Attorney General directing DiBaggio “until further notice, 
to submit to [the Deputy Attorney General] for review any proposed indictment in a 
public corruption matter.”4   
 One of the surprising aspects of the controversy is that anyone was terribly 
surprised. The local United States Attorney is, potentially, a major political actor in every 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School.  A.B. 1961, Harvard University, LL.B. 1965, Harvard 
Law School.  A grant from the Carney Fund at Boston College Law School provided research support.  A 
version of this article was presented at the 2004 Annual Convention of the American Political Science 
Association.  Many helpful comments were received. 
1 Doug Donovan, DiBiagio Voices Frustration Over Pace of Top Cases, BALT. SUN, July 15, 2004, at 1A. 
2 See id. 
3 A Vote of No Confidence, WASH. POST, July 20, 2004, at A16.  
4 Full text of letter to U.S. Attorney Thomas M. DiBiagio, BALT. SUN, July 16, 2004. 
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state.5  The federal government prosecutes state and local officials all the time,6 
sometimes in politically charged contexts.7  Totally apart from possible political 
dimensions, these prosecutions raise serious questions of constitutional federalism.   In 
Sabri v. United States8 the Supreme Court managed to avoid almost every one of them, 
while upholding federal prosecution of a routine local bribery scheme.  In the process, it 
issued a unanimous decision that seems both to confirm the national role in policing state 
and local officials and to cast doubt on the depth of the Court’s commitment to any “New 
Federalism.”9  One explanation for this apparent paradox is that the Court’s commitment 
to the precept is far from firm.  An alternative perspective emphasizes the fact that the 
defendant was convicted under a statute passed pursuant to the Spending Power10—the 
federal program bribery statute.11  The Court has suggested that Spending Power Statutes 
are exempt from whatever strictures the New Federalism imposes.12   
 In this Article, I offer a third perspective.  Sabri confirms the high priority that the 
Court places on the national government’s authority to fight corruption at any level in 
order to protect the democratic process and public confidence in it.  The key Supreme 
                                                 
5 See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine: Someone to Watch Over Us, 
31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153, 175-76 (1994) (referring to “the power federal prosecutors exercise over the 
political affairs of states and cities…”). 
6 See e.g., PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS 
ON THE ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS OF THE PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION FOR 2002 37, table 2 (2002).  
According to this table, 731 state and local officials were classified as indicted, convicted, or awaiting trial.  
See George D. Brown, New Federalism’s Unanswered Question: Who Should Prosecute State and Local 
Officials for Political Corruption, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 419, 421 (2003) [hereinafter Brown, 
Unanswered Question] (summarizing 20-year totals for these categories). 
7 NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 147 (3d ed. 
2000) (noting “potential for politically motivated prosecutions.)  See also Michael Powell, Scandals Plague 
Governor, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 8, 2004, at A5.  The Democratic governor of New Jersey and his aides 
have charged that corruption prosecutions by a Republican U.S. Attorney are aimed at furthering his own 
political career. 
8 Sabri v. United States, 124 S.Ct. 1941 (2004). 
9 See generally Brown, Unanswered Question, supra note 6 (discussing interaction between federal 
corruption prosecutions and “New Federalism” precepts). 
10 U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 1. 
11 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2000). 
12 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
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Court decision for understanding Sabri is one issued the same term:  McConnell v. 
FEC—the “Campaign Finance Reform” decision.13  There, the Court held that the 
governmental interest in combating corruption outweighs the powerful First Amendment 
interests at play in the political process.  In Sabri, the Court could be seen as holding that 
that same governmental interest outweighs powerful federalism arguments in favor of 
letting state and local governments prosecute their own officials.  In a sense, the 2003 
Term was the Anti-Corruption Term.  The Court showed sensitivity to the national mood 
of concern over abuse of power, and distrust of politicians and their susceptibility to 
corrupting influences.   
 True, the contexts of the two cases are different.  So are their contents.  
McConnell dealt at length with constitutional arguments against an array of restrictions 
on campaign-related activity and its financing.1415  There were definite splits among the 
justices.16  Sabri is the product of a unanimous Court.17  The analysis barely touches on 
the constitutional problems raised by the particular statutory issue presented.  Indeed, the 
reasoning seems almost simplistic, as developed below.  What unites the two cases, 
however, is a concern for integrity both in the political process itself and the 
governmental process that follows it.   
 Sabri looks like a run-of-the-mill bribery prosecution.  The defendant, a 
developer, had allegedly offered kickbacks and other inducements to a city councilor to 
facilitate a proposed project.  However, like many other prosecutions of state and local 
officials, Sabri was brought by federal officials in a federal court.  The statute which 
                                                 
13 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 124 S.Ct. 619 (2003). 
14  
15 See e.g., id. at 635-76 (discussing issue advocacy). 
16 E.g., id. at 720-29 (Scalia, J., dissenting 
17 Sabri, 124 S.Ct. 1941. 
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authorized this criminal proceeding is 18 U.S.C. § 666:  the federal program bribery 
statute—sometimes referred to as the “Stealth Statute,” or the “Beast in the Federal 
Criminal Arsenal.”18  It applies to any entity, including governments, that receives more 
than $10,000 a year in federal benefits.  Within such an entity, numerous acts are made 
federal crimes.  This case involved the portion of the statute which imposes federal 
criminal liability on anyone who  
 corruptly gives, offers, or agrees to give anything of value to any 
person, with intent to influence or reward an agent of an 
organization or of a State, local or Indian tribal government, or any 
agency thereof, in connection with any business, transaction, or 
series of transactions of such organization, government or agency 
involving anything of value of $5,000 or more.19 
 
 Under this language, it makes no difference whether any federal funds are 
involved in or connected to the proscribed transaction.  Once an entity is covered, the 
specified corrupt acts within it are federal crimes.  In Sabri, the Supreme Court 
considered, and rejected, arguments that some nexus to federal funds ought to be 
required.  This issue had divided the lower courts.20  For the Court, however, the crucial 
determinant was the national government’s ability to protect funds it had dispersed under 
the Spending Power by insuring the integrity of the recipient of those funds.21   
 The broad sweep of § 666 did not bother the Court at all.  Indeed, this breadth 
turns § 666 into something of a national anti-corruption statute.  Such a statute has long 
                                                 
18 See George D. Brown, Stealth Statute – Corruption, the Spending Power, and the Rise of 18 U.S.C. § 
666, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 247 (1998) [hereinafter Brown, Stealth Statute]; Daniel N. Rosenstein, Note, 
The Beast in the Federal Criminal Arsenal, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 673 (1990). 
19 18 U.S.C. §666(2) (2000). 
20 Sabri, 124 S.Ct. at 1945. 
21 Id. at 1946. 
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been the holy grail of federal prosecutors.22  Perhaps they already have it.  Still, if Sabri 
has, in fact, irrevocably tilted the debate on federal anti-corruption efforts in a nationalist 
direction, there may be more plausible and direct methods to reach this result, other than 
the rationale of somehow protecting federal funds.  If fighting corruption at all levels of 
government is part of the national government’s role in the American federal system, 
why not come out and say so?   
 Section I of the article deals with the underlying debate about the desirability of 
national prosecution of corrupt state and local officials.  In particular, the analysis 
considers whether one can reconcile the widespread phenomenon of such prosecutions 
with the tenets of the New Federalism, while recognizing that there may be alternative 
justifications for a broad national role.  Section II moves from the policy debate to its 
constitutional underpinnings.  This section first considers whether the Constitution itself 
speaks authoritatively to the question of corruption and, possibly, contains provisions that 
direct government not to be corrupt.  This section also considers the more modest 
question whether the grants of power to the national government can be read as 
permitting it to attack corruption at sub-national levels.  With this background, Section III 
of the Article examines and critiques the Sabri decision at some length.  In particular, the 
contention is made that the Court glossed over serious questions of constitutional law and 
statutory construction to arrive, seemingly, at the conclusion that protection of federal 
funds trumps any other consideration.  Nonetheless, it is helpful to view the decision in 
tandem with that of the earlier released complex set of opinions in McConnell v. FEC.23  
McConnell establishes that the prevention of corruption or the appearance thereof goes a 
                                                 
22 See ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 7, at 268-71 (discussing issues surrounding enactment of “a new 
federal statute aimed explicitly at state and local political corruption”). 
23 124 S.Ct. 619 (2003). 
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long way toward supplying whatever governmental interest is necessary to justify 
restrictions on campaign activity, even though such activity has a strong claim to First 
Amendment protection.  In other words, preventing corruption is seen by the Court as an 
essential function of the national government.  Such a view of national authority would 
justify a general federal anti-corruption statute.  It may be that § 666 in its present form 
represents such a statute.  Section IV of the Article, nonetheless, examines alternative 
rationales for upholding such a general statute, including an alternative rationale under 
the Spending Power itself.  The conclusion of the Article is that Sabri represents a missed 
opportunity to make a contribution to an important debate about the nature of the 
American federal system.  Nonetheless, the decision stands.  Perhaps, then, it answers 
many of the questions previously raised about the national role in fighting corruption at 
all levels.  Whether or not § 666 is the long-sought general statute, it certainly comes 
close.  Thus, McConnell and Sabri can be seen as two important steps down the road 
toward more vigorous anti-corruption efforts.   
I. Prosecuting Corruption and the New Federalism Debate 
 
 A. Defining Corruption 
 
 
                                                
A first step is to define corruption.  Professor Susan Rose-Ackerman focuses on 
the unwarranted intrusion of the private marketplace into the “democratic political system 
that grants a formal equality to each citizen’s vote. . . .”.24  In discussing “corruption as an 
economic problem,”25 she states the problem as follows: 
 
24 SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 1 (1978) [hereinafter ROSE-
ACKERMAN, POLITICAL ECONOMY]. 
25 SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM 7 
(1999) [hereinafter ROSE-ACKERMAN, CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES].  Thus, in describing the chapter on “The 
Economic Impact of Corruption,” she states that “this chapter isolates the most important situations where 
widespread corruption can determine who obtains the benefits and bears the costs of government action.”  
Id. at 9. 
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 Payments are corrupt if they are illegally made to public agents 
with the goal of obtaining a benefit or avoiding a cost.  Corruption 
is a symptom that something has gone wrong in the management 
of the state.  Institutions designed to govern the interrelationships 
between the citizen and the state are used instead for personal 
enrichment and the provision of benefits to the corrupt.  The price 
mechanism, so often a source of economic efficiency and a 
contributor to growth, can, in the form of bribery, undermine the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of government. 26 
 
 
                                                
However, it is possible to put forward broader definitions of corruption that focus 
on the officeholder, not the relationship between that individual and some third party 
attempting to affect/alter government decisions.  One such definition includes “nepotism 
(bestowal of patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit) and 
misappropriation (the illegal appropriation of public resources for private-regarding 
uses).”27    Here the emphasis is on improper rent seeking.   
 B. Corruption at the National Level 
 Whatever the definition of corruption, one can postulate several reasons why the 
national government might want to proscribe such behavior in its own ranks.  The basic 
argument can be seen in the President’s oath to “preserve, protect and defend the 
Constitution of the United States.”28  A democratic government has the inherent power, 
indeed the duty, to preserve the democratic system and the line it establishes between 
public and private “markets” for allocating goods and services.  Closely related to this 
argument is the contention that preventing corruption is essential to preserving public 
confidence and participation in the democratic process.29  One finds this contention in 
 
26 Id. at 9. 
27 ROSE-ACKERMAN, POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 23, at 7. n10 (quoting J.S. Nye, Corruption and 
Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 61 AM. POLITICAL SCI. REV. 417 (1967), reprinted in 
ARNOLD J. HEIDENHEIMER, POLITICAL CORRUPTION: READINGS IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, 567 (1970)). 
28 U.S. CONST. art I., § 1. 
29 E.g., Adam H. Kurland, The Guarantee Clause as a Basis for Federal Prosecutions of State and Local 
Officials, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 367 (1989). 
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numerous Supreme Court cases, primarily in the area of Campaign Finance Reform, 
where the anti-corruption imperative has been dominant.30  The contention has also 
played a key role in upholding conflict of interest legislation.31  In each context, the 
concept of the mere appearance of corruption or impropriety plays a large role in 
attempting to assess the impact of behavior on public attitudes towards the system as a 
whole.   
 Arguments based on improper incursion of the private market mechanism into the 
public sector include considerations of efficiency.  As Professor Ackerman puts it, 
“corruption can create inefficiencies and inequities and is, at best, inferior to legally 
established payment schemes.  Reforms can reduce the incentives for bribery and 
increase the risks of corruption.  The goal is not the elimination of corruption, but an 
improvement in the overall efficiency, fairness, and legitimacy of the state.”32  
Obviously, the national government has a strong concern with the efficiency of its own 
operations.  The view of corruption as improper rent seeking suggests additional 
considerations that the national government might take into account in policing 
corruption in its own ranks.  Like any employer, government can determine, and limit the 
compensation of its employees.  Beyond compensation, the government may wish to 
instill among its employees an imperative of honest public services.  Professor Vaughn 
                                                 
30 E.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390-91 (2000) (“The cynical assumption that large 
donors call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic governments.”).  
Political scientists have disputed this contention.  See Kelli Lammie and Nathaniel Persily, Perceptions of 
Corruption and Campaign Finance: When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 153 U. PA. L. 
REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2004).  See also E-mail from Professor David Primo (Sept. 3, 2003) (on file with 
the author) (“In statistical work I have done, there is virtually zero evidence that campaign finance laws or 
campaign spending have an influence on confidence in government.”). 
31 See United States v. Miss. Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 562 (“[A] democracy is effective only if 
the people have faith in those who govern, and that faith is bound to be shattered when high officials and 
their appointees engage in activities which arouse suspicions of malfeasance and corruption.”). 
32 ROSE-ACKERMAN, CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, supra note 24, at 4. 
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advocated a “public service” vision of public employment—“a vision containing a 
number of elements, but advocating the political neutrality of public employees and a role 
morality based on self-restraint as an ethical principle.”33  On a more basic level, such 
corrupt actions as embezzlement or theft may simply constitute crimes that the 
government is entitled to prosecute in any context, regardless of the happenstance of its 
status as victim.   
 C. Sub-national Corruption 
 However, when assessing the national government’s interests in preventing 
corruption at the state and local levels, many of these justifications largely disappear.  
What concern is it to Washington if Smallville is inefficient, lax on ethical standards, and 
even allows employees to supplement their salaries through liberal use of municipal 
property and funds?  As long as no federal funds are involved, it is hard to see any 
damage to the federal government from this behavior, or any federal interest in 
preventing it.  Several answers suggest themselves that might demonstrate a federal 
interest.  The first is that the conduct of all government officials is something the public 
views in unitary terms, regardless of the level at which it occurs.  Thus corruption at any 
level can undermine confidence in the system as a whole.34   
 Prosecuting state and local government is thus only another example of the 
fundamental national role of acting to preserve the democratic system.  The argument has 
an intuitive appeal, but seems short on empirical justification, although it is true that in 
other societies public perceptions of corruption have undermined confidence in basic 
                                                 
33 Robert G. Vaughn, Ethics in Government and the Vision of Public Service, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 417, 
418 (1990). 
34 See Kurland, supra note 28, at 377.  Professor Kurland states that “the public is entitled to honest 
government at all levels.  The faith that the citizenry places in all levels of government is the foundation of 
the republic.  Thus, anything that erodes that foundation is of substantial federal interest.” 
11 
governmental institutions.35  Nonetheless, the anti-corruption imperative present in both 
McConnell and Sabri may reflect the Court’s sense of a need for a response to a 
widespread public perception that “they are all crooks.”  Other national interests can be 
postulated to justify corruption prosecutions of state and local officials.  It may be that 
interstate externalities are present.  Corruption in, say, industrial permitting in State A 
may harm the rigor and integrity of the permitting process in State B.  This seems an 
example of the familiar race to the bottom argument as a justification for national 
intervention.36  One might view the role of the federal government as ensuring a fair 
balance in the competitive environment among the states generally.  Still, most state and 
local corruption seems to lack any clear interstate dimension.  Of course, other additional 
federal interests may be present depending on the context.  For example, local police 
corruption can threaten joint federal-state law enforcement in such areas as drug offenses 
and anti-terrorism efforts.37  Widespread economic failure of local governments might 
have national repercussions.  Alternatively, acts of corruption such as bribery may again 
be viewed as simply crimes, as in the context of transgressions by federal level officials.  
This is true, but does not demonstrate any federal interest in these crimes beyond the 
general federal interest in enacting a broad range of criminal statutes; a practice that has 
come under considerable attack, given our system’s supposed assumptions about the 
primacy of the states in defining the criminal law.38   
                                                 
35 See e.g., Juan Forero, Latin America Graft and Poverty Trying Patience with Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 24, 2004, at A1. 
36 For a brief summary of the “race to the bottom argument,” see GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 219-20 (4th ed. 2001). 
37 See e.g., Brown, Stealth Statute, supra note 17, at 260. 
38 See George D. Brown, Constitutionalizing the Federal Criminal Law Debate: Morrison, Jones, and the 
ABA, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 983 (2001) [hereinafter Brown, Constitutionalizing]; AM. BAR ASS’N, TASK 
FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW (1998); see 
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 Bribery, and similar attempts at distorting outcomes reached through political 
processes may present a special justification for federal intervention.  If corruption leads 
to inequality in the provision of public goods and services, a national role somewhat 
similar to the protection of civil rights may be justified.39  At some level, extreme state 
and local corruption might lead to a breakdown in particular governmental units.  Perhaps 
the Guarantee Clause40 justifies federal intervention in such extreme cases, but that seems 
different from the run-of-the mill—if sometimes glamorous—federal prosecutions of 
state and local officials for a wide range of misconduct.  In sum, there are plausible 
arguments for the current phenomenon of extensive federal prosecution of state and local 
officials for political corruption.  However, these arguments are hardly overwhelming.  
Federal interests can be postulated, but they are far from self-evident.  More to the point, 
arguments in favor of the federal prosecutions run directly counter to the notions of state 
autonomy, sovereignty and dignity that the current Court has often articulated, and which 
have come to be referred to as its “New Federalism.”41 
 D. (New) Federalism Concerns 
 Much has been written about the clash between federalism values and the large 
scale of anti-corruption prosecutions under discussion here.42  The criticism of the federal 
role in prosecuting state and local officials predates many of the Court’s recent New 
Federalism decisions.  Writing in 1994, Professor Moohr summed up much of that 
                                                                                                                                                 
generally ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 7, at 64-72 (outlining the debate over the proper scope of federal 
criminal law). 
39 See Brown, Unanswered Question, supra note 6, at 489-91 (discussing civil rights rationale). 
40 U.S. CONST. art IV, § 4. 
41 On the “new federalism,” see generally Calvin Massey, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 53 
HASTINGS L.J. 431 (2002). 
42 See e.g., Gregory Howard Williams, Good Government By Prosecutorial Decree: The Use and Abuse of 
Mail Fraud, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 137 (1990). 
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critique of the federal prosecutorial role, contending that the impairment of state and local 
decision making  
 is a result of the phenomenon that federal prosecutions for political 
corruption make state and local officials more accountable to an extrinsic 
entity, the federal government, than to those who voted for them.  An 
interventionists federal presence encourages citizens to abdicate their 
responsibility for self-government at the state and local levels.  The 
ultimate result is a diminished demand on state and local legislative and 
executive branches to control political corruption.  The power federal 
prosecutors exercise over the political affairs of states and cities is 
particularly troublesome in the area of criminal legislation, in which states 
traditionally have the ‘principal responsibility for defining and prosecuting 
crimes.’”43 
 
 
                                                
The Supreme Court’s emphasis on federalism in cases such as United States v. Lopez44 
and its recent Eleventh Amendment decisions45 seems to intensify that critique.  The essence of 
the New Federalism is two-fold:  an emphasis on the Constitution’s enumeration of powers as 
limiting the powers of the national government; and, the concept of states as quasi-sovereign, 
largely autonomous entities owed great respect by the co-equal national government.  For that 
government to usurp the quintessentially sovereign task of another government entity’s 
controlling its own officials seems totally at variance with what the Court has been saying.  It is 
true that no Supreme Court case has ever discussed at length the proper federal role in 
prosecuting state and local corruption.  Justice Thomas questioned it in a dissent,46 and a brief 
reference in Fischer v. United States47 invokes the federal-state balance in prosecuting bribery.48  
But even without explicit guidance, the logic of federalism, old and new, seems to cut sharply 
against the practice of widespread prosecution of sub-national officials.   
 
43 Moohr, supra note 5, at 175-76.   
44 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
45 E.g., Semiole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
46 Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 278 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
47 Fischer v. United States, 529 U.S. 667 (2000). 
48 See id. at 681. 
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 E. Beyond Traditional Federalism 
 In a recent paper on “Corruption and Federalism,”49 Prof. Roderick M. Hills, Jr. has made 
a significant contribution that takes the debate beyond traditional federalism considerations.  He 
offers a “cautiously pessimistic answer”50 to the question of whether federal prosecutions are 
likely to improve sub-national units of government.  His overall contention is that “these 
prosecutions could impose on non-federal governments federal conflict-of-interest rules that are 
fundamentally inconsistent with the style of democracy that flourishes at the non-federal level.”51 
 Professor Hills first characterizes the democratic values followed at the federal level as 
“bureaucratic populism.”52  The model is that of a central legislature laying down values and 
policies which are then implemented by professional bureaucrats whose principal fidelity is to 
those values.  Thus, those officials must be “insulated from private interests that might divert 
their judgment from national values,”53 and reigned in by such techniques as a civil service 
system and extensive conflict of interest rules.  In contrast to the bureaucratic populism of the 
national government, Professor Hills paints the following portrait of the “participatory populism” 
that predominates at the sub-national level.   
 Participatory populism rejects [the] separation of public and private spheres, 
instead mixing professional and lay decision-making.  The elected legislators are 
often, indeed usually, part-time, under-paid officers with substantial private 
interests in the community.  The administrative officers who carry out legislative 
policy are also usually lay people who serve part-time on supervisory bodies like 
planning commissions and school boards.  They, too, have full-time private 
interests.  This whole structure of lay-decision making is pervasively subjected to 
neighborhood, municipal, and state-wide plebiscites, allowing private citizens to 
sit as a kind of a super-legislature.  In short, the entire system of participatory 
                                                 
49 Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Corruption and Federalism: (When) Do Federal Criminal Prosecutions Improve 
Non-Federal Democracy? (manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Hills, Corruption]. 
50 Id. at 1. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 2. 
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populism is designed to maximize private access to public-decision making, 
promiscuously mingling public and private interests in the process.54   
 
 
                                                
Professor Hills argues that the federal corruption prosecutions run the risk of imposing 
one level’s set of values on the other without full appreciation of the costs.  He discusses at 
length the application of the “honest services” theory under the mail fraud statute in 
circumstances where the federal conflict-of-interest rules might better be put aside to respect the 
norms that had already been developed under state law.55  Clearly, Hills’ piece is an important 
contribution to the debate.  He takes that debate beyond formal considerations of New 
Federalism vs. a Garcia-based56 view of the system to examine the real world impact.  He also 
shifts focus away from the phenomenon of enforcement to the content of the underlying norms.  
One can, of course, take issue with aspects of his piece. For example, federal prosecution for 
hardcore forms of corruption such as bribery and extortion may not represent imposition of 
differing norms.  It is also possible that the overall division between the two sets of norms is not 
as clear as he would have it, given the ongoing efforts at professionalization of state and local 
governments, and the fact that they may use federal ethics precepts as models for their own 
development of rules governing officials.57  Nonetheless, “Corruption and Federalism” 
interposes yet one more objection to the arguments in favor of automatic acceptance of the 
national role in prosecuting state and local corruption.   
 Still, like the search for a federal interest, Hills’ argument is not directly based on the 
Constitution.  The New Federalism arguments against the prosecutions are more clearly 
constitutionally based, but they do not rise to the level of constitutional commands as 
 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 38. 
56 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transp. Auth., 488 U.S. 889 (1988). 
57 See generally William G. Buss Jr., The Massachusetts Conflicts-Of-Interest Statute: An Analysis, 45 B.U. 
L. REV. 299, 302-04 (1965) (noting use by Massachusetts of federal law as “model” for state legislation). 
16 
prohibitions.  Things would be easy if, for example, the Constitution contained language to the 
effect that “state and local governments shall not be corrupt.  Congress shall have the power to 
enforce this prohibition through appropriate legislation.”  The document contains no such 
nationalistic language; nor does it contain a federalistic prohibition on national anti-corruption 
legislation.  Instead, examination of the text yields uncertainty as to the constitutional status of 
federal anti-corruption prosecutions.  That is why background understandings and policy 
arguments loom large in the examination of those prosecutions.  Still, the text is not entirely 
silent.  Indeed, it is the ultimate source of the background understandings and policy arguments 
that are invoked to determine the ultimate validity of the widespread federal policing of state and 
local governments. 
II. Corruption and the Constitution 
 
 
                                                
A. The Constitution as a Direct Prohibition 
 
 A major recent contribution to the question of the Constitution’s bearing on the 
federal prosecutions is an article by Professor Peter Henning.58  His thesis is two-fold.  
Henning’s first contention is that “the Constitution reflects the deep concern of the 
Founders with preventing corruption—what I term the Constitution’s ‘Anti-Corruption 
Legacy’—a concern that supports congressional power to reach misconduct by officials 
at all levels of government for the misuse of public authority.”59  Professor Henning does 
not see a threat to the federalism values discussed above.  Quite the contrary:  “federal 
prosecution of corruption does not invade the sovereignty of the states because corruption 
undermines the balance established by federalism, and the national government must 
protect the integrity of both sides of the federalism equation.  The constitutional design to 
 
58 Peter J. Henning, Federalism and the Federal Prosecution of State and Local Corruption, 92 KY. L.J. 75 
(2003-2004). 
59 Id. at 81. 
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eliminate corruption demonstrates the Framers’ intent to guard against the threat to 
liberty from the misuse of public authority.”60   
 His second contention is that the “legacy” serves as a background understanding 
which should guide the construction of federal statutes potentially aimed at state and 
local corruption.  “In analyzing Congress’ constitutional power to enact a statute, the 
Anti-Corruption Legacy supports a broad interpretation of congressional authority to 
reach the conduct of state and local officials, regardless of whether the crime could also 
be prosecuted by the state.”61  Professor Henning cites and analyzes several provisions of 
the Constitution to demonstrate its anti-corruption commitment at the national level.  The 
following examples are invoked to improve his point:  “Bribery” as one of the grounds 
for impeachment; the prohibition of both change in the President’s compensation during 
his term of office and of his receipt of “any other Emolument from the United States, or 
any of them;” the prohibition on federal officeholders’ receipt of Emoluments from 
foreign sources; the prohibition on members of Congress being appointed to any federal 
office “which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been 
increased during such time” that the member was in office; and, the Appropriations 
Clause requiring congressional authorization before the executive can disburse funds.62  
He views these standards as “structural protections designed to limit the possibility of 
corruption in the federal government.”63   
 As for corruption at the state level, Professor Henning identifies additional 
provisions “to deal with the possibility of corruption or the misuse of authority in the 
                                                 
60 Id. at 81-82. 
61 Id. at 82. 
62 Id. at 87. 
63 Id. 
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states.”64  He cites both the Seventh Amendment’s guarantee of jury trial and the 
provision for diversity jurisdiction in Article III.65  He sees both as designed to limit the 
possibility of bias in state judicial proceedings and thus to provide a certain level of 
protection against corrupt state and local governments.66 
 Surprisingly, the Guarantee Clause plays a small role in Professor Henning’s 
overall analysis, being relegated to a footnote, albeit a long one.67  He sees the following 
role for the Clause: “by permitting a federal role in ensuring the integrity of state 
governments, the Guarantee Clause reflects the Founders’ concern with misuse of 
authority by the states.”68  However, “the national government has a very restricted 
authority to interfere in the administration of the state governments, triggered only by 
systemic misuse of state authority that undermines the legitimacy of the exercise of 
official power.  The federal concern is that abuse of authority should not reach a level 
that would result in the destruction of the state government by a tyrannical leader.”  69 
 The existence of such an anti-corruption “legacy” would play an important, 
perhaps dispositive, role in analyzing many of the questions raised by federal 
prosecutions of state and local officials.  Indeed, Professor Henning demonstrates this in 
his use of the “legacy” as a background understanding in a thorough and persuasive 
treatment of questions of interpreting the statutes under which corruption is prosecuted.  
However, the premise of any such legacy, particularly one that rises to the level of a 
guide to constitutional interpretation, seems questionable on several counts.  As an initial 
                                                 
64 Id. at 89. 
65 See id. 
66 See id. at 91. 
67 Id. at 92 n.66. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
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matter, if the Framers felt that strongly about state and local corruption, one might ask 
why they did not place in the document more specific prohibitions on it as well as 
national authority to deal with it.  Professor Henning’s argument seems further weakened 
by the relatively small role that the Guarantee Clause plays in it.  Far more than, say, the 
provision for Diversity Jurisdiction, that Clause can be interpreted as touching upon the 
overall quality of government within the states, through a broad construction of the 
concept of a “Republican Form of Government.”  The examples Professor Henning does 
invoke are hardly dispositive.  For example, the provision in Article III for Diversity 
Jurisdiction may well be a potential protection against one form of corruption, but it is 
present in a section that seems to leave the very decision to create lower federal courts as 
well as the extent of their jurisdiction up to Congress.70   
 Finally, there are nagging doubts about just why federal prosecution of state and 
local officials maintains the federal balance.  The natural reading of that term, to use 
Professor Henning’s words, is “that a balance between different levels of government 
will protect the liberty of the people by preventing one level from usurping the authority 
of the other.”71  The prosecutions can be seen as usurping state and local government’s 
inherent authority to police their own ranks as their own political processes deem 
appropriate.  Moreover, to the extent that they enhance the role of national actors, 
particularly the United States Attorney, within the sub-national political process, federal 
                                                 
70 ART. I, § 8 of the Constitution gives Congress the power “to constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme 
Court.”  I leave aside any arguments that Congress must vest in some court the federal jurisdiction provided 
for in ART III. 
71 Henning, supra note 57, at 85. 
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prosecutions disturb equilibrium and alter balance.  The Maryland experience, cited at the 
beginning of this article, is hardly unique.72 
 Professor Henning’s contention is that malfunctioning state and local 
governments undermine the federalism balance “by permitting individuals to purchase an 
outcome or by allowing public officials to misuse their authority for personal benefit, 
resulting in considerable social costs.”73  Because federalism requires viable governments 
at both levels, in order to protect individual liberty, these social costs prevent the system 
from functioning as designed.  Public authority must be legitimate, and act legitimately, 
at each level.  This is a strong argument, but it may not conclusively answer the question 
why a special role in maintaining that balance is granted to the federal government, 
especially if the assertion of that role is made without substantial reliance on the 
Guarantee Clause.  Thus, even granting this particular use of the concept of balance to 
permit an imbalance in the power of the two levels, the analysis may well come up short. 
 Reliance on the Guarantee Clause is central to one of the seminal articles in the 
anti-corruption field:  Professor Adam Kurland’s piece on “the Guarantee Clause as a 
Basis for Federal Prosecutions of State and Local Officials.”74  Kurland is a strong 
defender of the prosecutions on nationalist grounds.  In his view, “the primary federal 
interest in combating local corruption . . .is based on the principle that the public is 
entitled to honest government at all levels.  The faith that the citizenry places in all levels 
of government is the foundation of the republic.  Thus anything that erodes that 
                                                 
72 See generally ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 7, at 147-48 (discussing the perception that “a high profile 
political corruption case can serve as a stepping stone to a political career for the prosecutor”). 
73 Henning, supra note 57, at 85-86. 
74 Kurland, supra note 28.   
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foundation is of substantial federal interest.  The citizens of the United States are 
therefore entitled to federal protection from abuses of power by those who govern.” 75  
 At the same time, Kurland is strongly critical of the prosecutorial approach that, at 
the time he wrote, required extremely broad use of statutes based on the Postal Power and 
the Commerce Clause.  He views these statutes as not necessarily aimed at official 
corruption at all.  Thus, complex cases may not fit.76  More importantly, the statues used 
to combat state and local corruption all contain a jurisdictional predicate that connects the 
defendant’s conduct to a source of federal power such as commerce.  As Kurland puts it, 
“under the traditional analysis, the federal jurisdictional requirements of the statutes are 
essential to establish federal jurisdiction.  If it cannot be established that the mails were 
used or that interstate commerce was in some manner affected, certain types of criminal 
activity, although significant enough to warrant federal interests, will not satisfy the 
requisite jurisdictional threshold and will not qualify for federal prosecution.”77 
 His answer is to begin by approaching the problem directly and honestly.  “No 
one seriously contends that protecting the sanctity of interstate commerce, or protecting 
the integrity of the postal service, is the principal reason the federal government allocates 
so much time and resources toward prosecuting official corruption cases.”78  Still, some 
source of congressional power is necessary; a federal interest is not enough.  The federal 
government is potentially interested in everything.79  Kurland finds that power in the 
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Guarantee Clause which provides in part that “the United States shall guarantee to every 
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government. . . .”80 
 The language certainly points in the direction of some authority over state and 
local government, and perhaps even to the quality of that government.  “After all,” 
Kurland asks rhetorically, “what erodes a republican form of government more than 
corrupt officials?”81  He goes beyond an interpretation of the Clause that is limited to a 
concern with monarchy, and similar structural abuses, to a broader reading that reaches a 
guarantee of honest government.  He relies heavily on writings of the Framers, finding in 
addition to structural concerns, a moral dimension. The Framers cared about “public 
virtue” as an essential element of republican government.82  Drawing on the writings of 
John Adams, for example, Kurland finds again the view that “officials who corruptly 
exercise their authority and secretly enrich themselves substantially erode the foundation 
of republican government.”83    
 As for federalism, and the notion of a national government limited by a small 
number of enumerated powers, Kurland views the Guarantee Clause as conceptually 
different from those powers:  a command to the national government to preserve the basic 
republican structure and the conditions requisite to its functioning.  In this respect, 
Kurland’s views resemble Henning’s later analysis of the national government as the 
protector of the federal system through its anti-corruption efforts.  Both contentions have 
the advantage of placing the federal prosecutorial role within the logic of the federal 
system as a whole.  Reconciling the prosecutions with federalism is thus not a problem.  
                                                 
80 U.S. CONST. art IV, § 4. 
81 Kurland, supra note 28, at 417. 
82 Id. at 428-29. 
83 Id. at 429. 
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Indeed, Kurland sees the Guarantee Clause as like the Fourteenth Amendment:  “a 
constitutional provision that necessarily intrudes on state sovereignty and alters the 
normal federal state balance.”84   
 Where Henning and Kurland differ is in the latter’s contention that the Guarantee 
Clause acts as a grant of power.  He finds historical support for this view of the Clause, 
primarily in its use in the Reconstruction legislation.85  He proposes an anti-corruption 
statute, based on the Clause, that provides in part that “whoever knowingly executes or 
attempts to execute any scheme or artifice to defraud or deprive the citizenry of a State or 
locality of its right to honest, faithful, and loyal government of such State or locality, 
shall be fined. . . or imprisoned. . . .”86  Indeed Kurland presents evidence that some 
members of Congress have agreed with his view that a general anti-corruption statute 
could be enacted under the Guarantee Clause.87  The main advantage of his thesis is that 
it represents a plausible basis for dealing directly with the problem of the prosecutions:  
validation under a general statute, of those prosecutions.  However, Congress has never 
taken such a broad view of its power, as Kurland admits.88  More importantly, recent 
Supreme Court invocations of the Guarantee Clause seem to view it more as a source of 
state autonomy than a font of federal power.89   
 B. The Enumerated Powers 
 Both Henning and Kurland make important contributions to the debate.  Suppose, 
however, that one rejects the thesis that the Constitution addresses the issue of state and 
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local corruption, either through a direct prohibition or through provisions strong enough 
to create a background understanding about this corruption.  That is not the end of the 
matter in terms of finding federal power to bring the prosecutions.  Congress may well be 
able to make the basic value judgment, as it has in so many other areas, through exercise 
of the enumerated powers.  In fact, three of these powers are the bases on which most 
federal anti-corruption law rests.  The Postal Power is the source of the mail fraud statute, 
an important tool in the federal prosecutors’ arsenal.90  As a textual matter, this outcome 
requires a series of leaps.  One can concede, following Chief Justice Marshall’s 
hypotheticals in McCulloch v. Maryland, that Congress may enact criminal statutes to 
protect the mails.91  One can also concede that Congress can protect the “integrity” of the 
mails by barring therefrom communications that are a part of a criminal scheme.92  The 
problem with modern mail fraud—as a matter of relating the corruption prosecutions to 
the constitutional text and scheme—is that almost any mailing somewhere along the line 
has become enough to justify a federal criminal trial.93  If we limit our search to the text 
of the Postal Power and a reasonable construction of it, this power does not seem to be 
the basis of a general anti-corruption statute. 
 The Commerce Clause presents more complex questions.  We are used to a legal 
universe in which this Clause is the basis for a range of moral judgments about practices 
Congress wishes to condemn. 94  While Lopez reminds us that the Commerce Clause has 
limits, the Clause has nonetheless played a key anti-corruption role.  The Hobbs Act is 
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the major example.95  The Act requires an effect on commerce as a jurisdictional 
predicate for prosecuting the crimes, including extortion, under color of official right, that 
it prohibits.  It is, indeed, possible to imagine specific instances of corruption that have 
such an effect.  Part IV of this Article will explore briefly broader notions of corruption 
as an economic activity in and of itself.  Taking the language of the Hobbs Act, and its 
case-by-case emphasis, as representative of current approaches to the Commerce Clause, 
the leap from commerce to any general anti-corruption statute requires some effort.   
 The third source of congressional power, the one endorsed in Sabri, is the 
Spending Power.  Congress can “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises to 
pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United 
States. . . .”96  It is not a leap to conclude that the general welfare includes governments 
free from corruption, especially given a history of deference to Congress’ determination 
of what the general welfare means.  Congress could, for example, enact a grant program 
to fund state and local anti-corruption efforts.  It could probably attach anti-corruption 
“strings” to federal grant programs to those units of government.  Sabri, however, 
involves a statute that does neither.  18 U.S.C. §666 is a criminal statute, apparently 
designed to protect federal funds from diversion and other dishonest practices.  After 
Sabri, the statute has become the closest thing our system has to a general federal anti-
corruption law.97  The fact that the Court took this extraordinary step, and did so almost 
casually, merits close examination.   
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III.  Section 666 and Sabri—No Limits? 
 
 A. Section 666 
 
 18 U.S.C. §666 provides, in part, as follows:   
 (a) Whoever, if the circumstance described in subsection (b) of this section 
exists-- 
 
 (1) being an agent of an organization, or of a State, local, or Indian tribal 
government, or any agency thereof-- 
 (A) embezzles, steals, obtains by fraud, or otherwise without authority 
knowingly converts to the use of any person other than the rightful owner or 
intentionally misapplies, property that-- 
 (i) is valued at $5,000 or more, and 
 (ii) is owned by, or is under the care, custody, or control of such organization, 
government, or agency; or 
 (B) corruptly solicits or demands for the benefit of any person, or accepts or 
agrees to accept, anything of value from any person, intending to be influenced or 
rewarded in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of 
such organization, government, or agency involving any thing of value of $5,000 
or more; or 
 (2) corruptly gives, offers, or agrees to give anything of value to any person, with 
intent to influence or reward an agent of an organization or of a State, local or 
Indian tribal government, or any agency thereof, in connection with any business, 
transaction, or series of transactions of such organization, government, or agency 
involving anything of value of $5,000 or more; 
 
 shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both. 
 
 (b) The circumstance referred to in subsection (a) of this section is that the 
organization, government, or agency receives, in any one year period, benefits in 
excess of $10,000 under a Federal program involving a grant, contract, subsidy, 
loan, guarantee, insurance, or other form of Federal assistance.98 
 
 
                                                
Obviously, the statute raises a host of questions.  If for example one removes 
subsection (b) and the reference to it after “whoever” in subsection (a), it looks like a 
general anti-corruption statute.  Not only are the classic corruption offenses of bribery 
and offers of bribes covered; subsection (a)(1)(A) covers a variety of other crimes, two of 
which might be subject to broad interpretation.  As discussed below, the concept of fraud 
 
98 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2000). 
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has been developed, in the context of the mail fraud statute, into a broad category of 
“honest services.”99  Potentially, then, §666, either through the concept of fraud or the 
uncertain crime of “misapplication” could apply to a wide variety of corrupt acts beyond 
the classic bribery offenses.  Of course, subsection (b) is part of the statute as well.  Thus 
it contains two limits:  the $5,000 minimum for any of the covered transactions and, more 
importantly, the requirement that the entity whose agent is prosecuted receive more than 
$10,000 in federal assistance each year.  However, given the large number of 
governmental, and other, entities that receive this amount of federal funding each year, 
the question arises whether the limits play a meaningful role in preventing the statute 
from being the long-sought general anti-corruption law.   
 The major debate surrounding the statute has been addressed to this very question, 
and has involved the issue of a possible “nexus” requirement within the statute.  That is, 
should courts require that the prosecution not only prove the corrupt acts and the receipt 
of the funds, but should a connection between the federal funds and the corruption be 
present in the case as well?  Opinions have differed as to whether any such requirement 
would be read into the statute as an element, or whether it is the ultimate test of the 
statute’s validity if applied to situations where no such connection exists.100   
 Closely related to the question of the statute’s validity is the conceptual dilemma 
of how to analyze it.  Virtually everyone agrees that Section 666 was passed pursuant to 
the congressional Spending Power.101  It would thus seem to follow that the classic test 
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for examining the validity of Spending Power statutes as laid out in South Dakota v. 
Dole102 would be the appropriate analytical framework.  Dole, however, involved 
assessment of the validity of conditions attached to federal grant programs.103  Although 
often criticized as toothless, the multi-part Dole test has the potential to impose real limits 
on grant conditions.104  The problem with applying it in the present context is that while 
§666 may have been passed pursuant to the Spending Power, it is not a grant condition.  
Nor is it specifically phrased as a “Cross-Cutting” condition that applies to all grant 
recipients.  Rather, it is a criminal statute that applies to the “agents” of entities receiving 
more than $10,000 in federal funds each year.  The constitutional question that then arises 
is whether such a criminal statute is a more intrusive exercise of federal authority than the 
grant conditions that have been measured under Dole.  As noted, efforts have been made 
to temper the statute by applying to it some form of nexus or connection requirement 
derived from the “relatedness” prong of the Dole test.105  Recent scholarship, particularly 
the work of Prof. Richard Garnett, has emphasized the possible role of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause in analyzing the validity of a criminal statute, passed under the Spending 
Power, not directly applicable to the recipients of the funds.106 
 B. Some Preliminary Questions 
 The ultimate question posed by the statute is what the federal role should be in 
policing state and local corruption through creation of a federal criminal offense.  It 
seems clear from the legislative history that the drafters had no such lofty ambitions in 
mind as creating a general anti-corruption statute and did not view an enactment 
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concerning “Theft or bribery concerning programs receiving Federal funds” as presenting 
these fundamental issues.  Congress was faced with what it viewed as the inadequacy of 
existing methods of protecting federal funds in the hands of local officials and their sub-
grantees.  However narrow the problem Congress was addressing, it passed a broad 
statute with the potential to evolve into an across-the-board anti-corruption statute 
carrying with it an alteration of the federal state balance.107  For an initial period, the 
statute developed “below the radar.”  However, a number of Court of Appeals decisions 
and a growing body of academic literature brought the “stealth statute” to light in the late 
1990s.108  Indeed, prior to Sabri the Supreme Court had already issued two significant 
opinions concerning §666.   
 C. §666 in the Supreme Court Before Sabri. 
 The Court first dealt with the statute in the 1997 case of Salinas v. United 
States.109  The unanimous decision upheld a broad construction of the statute against the 
contention that it might require that “the Government. . . proved the bribe in some way 
affected federal funds, for instance by diverting or misappropriating them, before the 
bribe violates [it].”110  The Court rejected any “interpretation that federal funds must be 
affected.”111  It relied primarily on the broad language of the statute.  The opinion does 
not stand for the proposition that §666 raises no constitutional issues.  The Court 
emphasized that there was “no serious doubt about the constitutionality” of the statute “as 
applied to the facts of this case.” 112  Indeed, the Court concluded that “the statute is 
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constitutional as applied in this case.”113  The opinion did not reject a nexus requirement, 
holding only that the government did not have to prove federal funds were “involved” in 
the bribery at issue.  Thus, while hospitable to the statute, Salinas contains tantalizing 
suggestions that serious constitutional questions do, indeed, lurk beneath the surface.114   
 The Court continued its hospitable construction of §666 in Fischer  v. United 
States.115  At issue was whether hospitals participating in the Medicare program received 
“benefits” under §666(b), thus triggering its criminal provisions.  The Court concluded 
that participation in the program resulted in receipt of benefits, turning to Salinas for 
support of a construction of §666 that could be described as “expansive,” “both as to the 
[conduct] forbidden and the entities covered.”116  Again, the Court showed awareness of 
and concern for the potential federalism issues raised by the breadth of the statute and the 
need to limit it.  The majority stated that it did not wish to “turn almost every act of fraud 
or bribery into a federal offense, upsetting the proper federal balance.” 117 Indeed, 
Justices Thomas and Scalia dissented, relying in part on federalism considerations such 
as those enunciated in United States v. Lopez.118  For the dissenters, “without a 
jurisdictional provision that would ensure that in each case the exercise of federal power 
is related to the federal interests in a federal program, §666 would criminalize routine 
acts of fraud or bribery, which, as the Court admits, would ‘upset the proper federal 
balance.’” 119  Their dissent, as well as the cautionary notes sounded by the entire Court 
                                                 
113 Id. 
114 See Brown, Unanswered Question, supra note 6, at 506-09.  Professor Coffee reads Salinas broadly as, 
apparently, resolving any constitutional issues.  See John C. Coffee Jr., Modern Mail Fraud: The 
Restoration of the Public/Private Distinction, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 427, 459 (1998). 
115 Fischer, 529 U.S. 667. 
116 Id. at 678. 
117 Id. at 681. 
118 Id. at 682-93 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
119 Id. at 689. 
31 
in Salinas, appeared to indicate a continuing awareness of the federalism issues and 
constitutional questions referred to above.  However, in Sabri v. United States,120 caution 
disappeared.   
 D. Sabri 
 Sabri involved indictment of a Minneapolis developer for the following corrupt 
acts:  offering a $5,000 kickback to a City Councilor for obtaining regulatory approvals; 
offering a $10,000 bribe to the Councilor to set up a meeting with objecting abutters; and, 
a 10% commission on community economic development grants that the defendant 
sought from the city and its funding entity for housing and economic development.121  
The proposed prosecution easily met the requisites of §666.  In the year of the acts at 
issue the Minneapolis City Council had administered 29 million dollars in federal funds.  
Moreover, the housing and economic development entity from which the defendant 
sought aid was, itself, a substantial recipient of federal funds.  Defendant Sabri 
challenged the indictment on the ground that §666 “is unconstitutional on its face for 
failure to require proof of a connection between the federal funds and the alleged bribe, 
as an element of liability.” 122 The district court agreed with this contention, and 
dismissed the indictment on grounds of facial invalidity.123  A divided Eighth Circuit 
reinstated the indictment, and both upheld the statute and construed it as not requiring 
proof of a connection between a bribe and federal funds.124   
 This decision accentuated a split among the circuits, reflecting the constitutional 
issues referred to above, whether a connection with federal funds was in fact necessary to 
                                                 
120 Sabri, 124 S.Ct. 1941.  
121 Id. at 1944. 
122 Id. at 1945. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
32 
permit federal prosecution of the conduct under the Spending Power.125  The Supreme 
Court stated that its reason for granting certiorari was to resolve this circuit conflict.126  
The Court had no problem in resolving the issue in favor of a broad construction of the 
statute dispensing altogether with any nexus requirement, and “readily dispose[d]” of the 
contention that this broad construction posed any constitutional problem.127  Indeed, 
although there were two separate concurring opinions,128 no Justice seemed to see any 
problem with the constitutionality of §666 as a general anti-corruption statute.   
 The Court’s opinion is a model of simplicity.  First of all, Congress had 
unquestioned authority to appropriate federal grant funds to further the general welfare.129  
Although the Court did not refer to the facts at hand on this point, the housing and other 
grants received by Minneapolis are typical examples of the Spending Power in action.  
Second, Congress has “corresponding authority” under the Necessary and Proper Clause 
“. . . to see to it that taxpayer dollars appropriated under [the Spending Power] are in fact 
spent for the general welfare, and not frittered away. . . .”130  Congress could well be 
concerned that dishonest public officers who are untrustworthy stewards or who do not 
deliver dollar-for-dollar value will not distinguish according to the source of funds when 
committing their corrupt acts.131  Furthermore, the fungibility of federal funds is an 
additional reason for not requiring proof of their presence in any particular corrupt 
activity.132  The Court invoked Justice Marshall’s venerable hypothetical in McCulloch to 
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the effect that the power to establish post-offices and post-roads leads to authority to 
“punish those who steal letters.”133 
 The Court’s short and simple analysis almost masks the fact that it adopted one of 
the major contending arguments in the ongoing debate over the constitutionality of §666:  
the integrity rationale.  The rationale proceeds on the assumption that measures directed 
at transactions involving federal funds will often be insufficient to protect those funds.  
What is needed is a broad net that achieves protection through sweeping up all corrupt 
transactions in order to guarantee the integrity of the recipient entity.134  However, this 
rationale can readily extend to treating the concern for state and local integrity as the 
major federal interest, with the protection of federal funds operating almost as a pretext.  
Federalism concerns were barely mentioned in Sabri.  The Court relegated any problems 
stemming from “federal prosecution in an area historically of state concern” to a 
footnote.135  It found United States v. Lopez136 and United States v. Morrison 137 totally 
inapplicable because those Commerce Clause cases involved activity that had little 
relation to economic conduct that Congress could regulate.  Here, there was no need to 
“pile inference upon inference” since the Spending Power was directly involved. 138  In 
sum, whatever constitutional reservations the debate over §666 had previously 
engendered and had come to light in Salinas were summarily rejected.  After Sabri, §666 
seems free to roam the political landscape as long as the sub-national entity where it 
comes into play receives more than $10,000 in federal funds “in any one year,” and the 
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corrupt transaction involves more than $5,000 or, in the Court’s words, “goes well 
beyond liquor and cigars.”139   
 Having given total victory to the broad reading of §666, the Court seemed almost 
to take it away in a curious “afterword” dealing with Sabri’s ability to bring a facial 
challenge to the statute.140  The Court expressed substantial doubt about the wisdom of 
such challenges and noted that “the acts charged against Sabri himself were well within 
the limits of legitimate congressional concern.” 141  If he was making an overbreadth 
challenge to the effect that the statute could not be enforced against someone else, the 
Court seemed to say that such challenges are limited to a “relatively few settings. . . .”142  
This “afterword” raises the interesting question whether the Court decided anything at all 
with respect to the narrow (nexus) reading of §666 or the broad one.  As the 
government’s brief noted, neither party advocated the nexus reading.143  The government, 
after all, wanted the broad one.  Sabri, on the other hand, would lose, even under the 
narrow one, since federal funds appeared to be clearly involved in his schemes.  Thus, the 
Court purported to resolve the predicate issue of statutory construction without either 
party arguing one of the contending sides.   
 It may be objected that Sabri, at least, did argue for a nexus requirement as 
essential to the statute’s validity as part of his facial challenge.  In the “afterword” the 
Court cast doubt on whether he could bring it at all.  Indeed, since there was already a 
Supreme Court decision upholding the statute as applied (Salinas), it is particularly hard 
to see how there was any serious argument for a facial challenge.  The government, in 
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fact, opposed the grant of certiorari on the grounds that there was no justiciable issue.144  
Perhaps the Court had to decide the construction issue to reach the validity question, but 
the Court’s own words raise issues as to whether the validity question was properly 
before it.  Perhaps this apparent dictum belongs in the arcane world of overbreadth and 
other issues relating to facial challenges, and Sabri should be read as standing for what it 
says.  However, the “afterword” suggests that the Court might have dismissed the petition 
as improvidently granted, or otherwise ducked the broad issues concerning §666’s 
construction and validity.145  The conclusion is inescapable that the Court reached out to 
take a strong anti-corruption stand in order to emphasize its condemnation of corrupt 
activities at all levels of government.   
 The central aspect of the Court’s constitutional analysis in Sabri is its acceptance 
of the integrity rationale, that is, that the federal government can act “to safeguard the 
integrity” of grant recipients in order to protect the disbursed funds.146  Obviously, 
integrity might have several meanings.  The term might be limited to the federal funds 
themselves or to the broader manner in which a particular federally funded program is 
administered.  For example, in Salinas, correction officials took bribes to permit conjugal 
visits to federal prisoners housed in a state jail.147  Integrity might mean the fiscal honesty 
of a recipient unit as a whole.  Again, one can see a tie, albeit less direct, to the federal 
funds.  However, integrity will certainly bear a much broader reading:  the general quality 
of a recipient unit, in the case of a governmental one, whether or not it practices “good 
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government.”  One could surely find a lack of integrity in a governmental unit in which 
nepotism and patronage are rampant, “no-show” jobs exist, opposition parties are 
squelched by entrenched officeholders and there is a general sense of helplessness on the 
part of excluded groups.  Would the Sabri rationale permit the federal government to 
regulate these practices directly, for example, by penalizing the awarding of patronage 
jobs?  Ultimately there could be a relation back to some federal funds, in the sense that 
administrative positions with control over those funds might not be awarded on merit, but 
the goal of federal intervention seems to be the use of the Spending Power to achieve 
broader federal public policy ends of good government.   
 In this respect, the case most on point is Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service 
Commission.148  A variant on the Hatch Act was designed to prohibit partisan activity by 
state or local employees “whose principal employment is in connection with any activity 
which is financed in whole or part by loans or grants made by the United States or by any 
Federal agency. . . .”149  An elaborate procedure provided for hearings by the United 
States Civil Service Commission to determine if the forbidden partisan conduct had 
occurred.  In the event of a positive finding, the Commission was to “certify” to the 
granting agency an “order requiring it to withhold” from the relevant grants a sum tied to 
the officials’ compensation.150  The Supreme Court upheld the statute on traditional 
Spending Power grounds:  Oklahoma had the choice of not taking the finds in the first 
place, and had accepted the conditions that accompanied the grant.151  However, the 
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Court noted the end sought by the provision at issue:  “better public service by requiring 
those who administer funds for national needs to abstain from active political 
partisanship.”152  Oklahoma thus represents a clear endorsement of use of the grant 
device to further national values of good public administration.  Section 666 seems to go 
even further in this direction through the integrity pretext.  This rationale allows Congress 
to reach deeply into the operations of any recipient government and has the potential to 
come close to federalizing any recipient of federal funds.  The Court failed to sound the 
cautionary note that federalism values would seem to require and that it had, indeed, 
sounded in Salinas.   
 The important question of constitutional method previously referred to then 
arises:  what is the proper framework for analyzing the validity of §666?  It is tempting to 
use the analysis the Court set forth in Dole for exercises of the Spending Power.  That 
analysis remains the vehicle for challenges to federal grant conditions.153  However, §666 
is not a condition; rather, it is a direct command enforceable through the criminal law.  In 
that respect, it differs from the typical grant case, even from Oklahoma in which it is true 
that the key enforcement proceeding concerning a particular official’s conduct took place 
at the federal level.  Indeed, it might be contended that direct criminal laws such as §666 
are more intrusive on federalism values and that accusations that the Dole test is too lax 
make it even less appropriate in this context.  Nonetheless, Dole remains the Court’s 
principal exposition of an approach to the Spending Power, and it may be helpful even if 
used by analogy.  If the crucial question is how to cabin §666 through some sort of nexus 
or connection, the Dole requirement that a condition be related to the purpose of a 
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particular grant seems relevant and helpful.154  Building on it, one can argue that at some 
point the integrity rationale takes the federal government too far away from the act of 
spending and too far into the internal operations of recipient entities.   
 Despite this attraction, however, Professor Garnett, has argued that “Dole’s 
usefulness as a translator for these federal-nexus claims is overstated, and Dole-based 
challenges to §666 and its applications are misplaced.  Properly understood, the issue is 
not whether the statute or its uses satisfy that case’s . . .criteria but whether those criteria 
apply at all.”155  The point is that the element of choice in the acceptance of any particular 
grant is missing.  Thus, principles based on that element are not helpful in evaluating a 
statute which is not linked to any contractual element of choice.  It is at this point that 
analysis based on the Necessary and Proper Clause comes to play an important role.  The 
task for Necessary and Proper analysis is to find in it limits that will prevent a statute as 
broad as §666 from becoming a “sweeping” prohibition of state and local corruption.  
Professor Garnett sees the danger of a combination of the Spending Power and the 
Necessary and Proper Clause that leads to a point where Congress can regulate or outlaw 
anything.156  The search for limits leads to what he and others have called the “non-
infinity” principle.157  Limits might be introduced by harking back to the need for “fit” 
between a particular law and the enumerated powers of Congress and the limitations on 
them such as the Bill of Rights.158  However, the relatively short shrift that the Court gave 
to Necessary and Proper arguments in Sabri suggests that they do not yet add a great deal 
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to the attempt to limit §666.159  Of course, it must be noted that federalism arguments got 
equally short shrift, perhaps, as I have suggested, because of the Court’s desire to make a 
strong anti-corruption statement. 
 In the end, that is the lesson and the question that we must take from Sabri:  to 
what extent does a perceived national anti-corruption imperative, whatever its source, 
overcome considerations of federalism?  The Maryland example shows that perceived 
extreme cases of intervention can be curbed, but the general phenomenon persists.  
Certainly the widespread prosecution of state and local officials for the manner in which 
they govern raises serious questions.  Holding those officials accountable for their style 
of governance ought to be as much a matter of constitutional concern as the policies they 
adopt, a subject deemed to merit that concern in both New York v. United States160 and 
Printz v. United States161.  As suggested, the use of direct federal criminal law seems 
even more of an intrusion than the typical grant enforcement mechanism, even one as 
federalized as that in Oklahoma.  After all, it will usually be the federal grantor agency 
that takes the lead in determining non-compliance with any particular condition.  A 
criminal statute like §666 breaks the grantor agency-grantee agency relationship, and 
introduces the United States Attorney, an actor whose priorities may have nothing to do 
with the grant program.  Moreover, by the very fact of enacting an additional federal 
criminal statute, Congress can be seen to invade the province of the states in yet another 
way.162 
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 At this point, it is instructive to compare Sabri with McConnell. McConnell 
upheld restrictions on campaign finance practices and related activities, restrictions that 
could be enforced through the criminal law.  The restrictions were imposed by Congress 
in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002163 (BICRA).  BICRA increased the level 
of regulation of federal campaigns in two ways.  It sharply curtailed the role of “soft 
money”— contributions to political parties for purposes other than the direct influencing 
of a national election.164  BICRA also imposed substantial limits on “issue ads,” defined 
by the Court as ads “specifically intended to affect election results,”165 but omitting 
“magic words” such as “Elect John Smith,” or “Vote against Jane Doe.”166  Opponents 
mounted a substantial First Amendment challenge to BICRA, but a majority of the Court 
built upon the line of cases beginning with Buckley v. Valo,167 and amplified in later 
precedent such as Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC,168 to formulate a set of 
anti-corruption governmental interests that met the government’s burden to justify 
incursions on the First Amendment.169  The government interest goes beyond preventing 
quid pro quo corruption170 to countering “the appearance or perception of corruption,”171 
and even to “the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large 
contributions.”172 
 One can, of course, identify differences between the two cases.  In McConnell, the 
statute regulated the electoral process. In Sabri, the statute regulated the functioning of 
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government.  McConnell involved the regulation of activities primarily at the federal 
level.  Sabri involved regulation of activities at the local level.  In McConnell, the 
activities regulated were essentially political advocacy and political contributions.  In 
Sabri, the regulated activity was bribery.  In McConnell, the principal constitutional 
defense against the challenged statute was the First Amendment.  In Sabri, the challenge 
was based on federalism.  Finally, McConnell relied substantially on notions of public 
confidence and the appearance of impropriety.  Sabri focused substantially on the 
integrity of governmental operations. 
 Despite these differences, I see the two cases united by a broad anti-corruption 
imperative that justifies Congress’ role as the guardian of the democratic process at all 
stages and at all levels.  Each case focused on the importance of integrity in government.  
The integrity of recipient governments is the key to Sabri’s protection of federal funds 
rationale.  McConnell invoked prior precedents as demonstrating a congressional interest 
in protecting “the integrity of our system of representative democracy.”173  As in Sabri, 
the notion of “integrity” is central to the analysis.174  Indeed, parts of McConnell point in 
a “good government” direction.175  Beyond a similar approach to recognizing Congress’ 
role in achieving good government, each case demonstrates considerable deference to 
Congress in determining how to achieve that goal, even in the face of serious 
constitutional objections. 
 E. §666 after Sabri  
                                                 
173 Id. at 647. 
174 The term “integrity” appears at several points in the McConnell opinion.  E.g., Id.; Id at 656; Id. at 658, 
n.42. 
175 See Id. at 664 (“Plaintiffs conceive of corruption too narrowly.”); Id at 666.  (“Just as troubling to a 
functioning democracy as classic quid pro quo corruption is the danger that officeholders will decide issues 
not on the merits or the desires of their constituencies, but according to the wishes of those who have made 
large financial contributions valued by the officeholder.”) 
42 
 Sabri certainly looks like a sweeping victory for proponents of national anti-
corruption efforts.  Before further examination of how best to vindicate that position, it 
may be useful to consider whether the decision completely forecloses any consideration 
of the constitutionality of §666 in a case where there is little if any perceptible nexus 
between federal funds and the corrupt act charged.  At first blush, the answer would seem 
to be yes, given the Court’s adoption of the no-nexus construction of the statute and its 
equally strong adoption of the integrity rationale for that conclusion.  However, there 
remains the somewhat troubling “afterword,” as well as the previous language in Salinas 
suggesting that the question was an open one.  Recall that the Sabri Court stated that, at 
best, he could be asserting that the statute would be unconstitutional as applied to 
someone else, and refused to let him assert that person’s hypothetical challenge.  What 
happens now if such a person comes before the Court armed with a challenge that Sabri, 
who was clearly attempting to tamper with federal funds, could not make?   
 Perhaps the opinion means exactly what it seems to say, foreclosing further 
consideration of the matter.  The best guess is that the Court will, in fact, treat the matter 
as closed; any other reading would require treating the first part of the decision as dictum, 
with the holding coming only in the afterword.  Perhaps traditional values such as those 
associated with Article III and highly case-specific adjudication would have better served 
if the “afterword” was the only decision.  Certainly, federalism would have been better 
served if the issue of potentially narrowing §666 could have been fought out in a case 
where the parties could focus both on construction of the statute and on the possibility of 
a nexus requirement as the ultimate standard in as-applied challenges.  In Sabri no one 
disagreed about the construction of the statute.   
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 Let us take the Court at its word, however.  We now have something very close to 
a general anti-corruption statute in the form of §666.  How far it extends will then 
depend, not on any judicial oversight, but on the restraint and/or creativity of federal 
prosecutors.  There will be some direct supervision from Washington, whether through 
specific interventions as in Maryland, or through the general guidance of the United 
States Attorneys Manual.  But individual discretion will be extensive.  In the remainder 
of this article, I wish to focus on the nationalist, anti-corruption values that Sabri 
unquestionably advances.  The goal is to raise the question whether a more satisfactory 
constitutional basis for the approach is possible and desirable.   
IV. Beyond Sabri—Alternative Bases for Federal Anti-Corruption Efforts 
 
 Taking our cue from Sabri, let us assume that the constitutional climate is 
favorable to the nationalist view of federal anti-corruption efforts, and that federalism 
questions have been resolved in the favor of those efforts.  It does not follow that Sabri is 
the last word.  The question remains both whether §666 should now emerge as the major 
broad-based anti-corruption statute, and whether there are alternative constitutional 
justifications for the federal role other than protecting federal funds disbursed under the 
Spending Power.  In this section, I wish to offer briefly some observations on the latter 
point.  It is worth beginning, however, with the form of an ideal statute.  Both Professor 
Kurland’s proposal and earlier legislation supported by the Justice Department relied 
primarily on the concept of deprivation and defrauding of “the honest services” of public 
officials.176  Honest services is a concept that has developed in the interpretation of the 
mail fraud statute, as discussed below.  It is exceedingly broad in scope, encompassing 
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transactional forms of corruption such as bribery, and, probably, failure to disclose 
breaches of fiduciary duties, as well as establishing a broad range of fiduciary duties.177  
It is far from clear that §666 can be expanded to encompass the range of corruption 
reached by the honest services concept.  The statute does include obtaining “by fraud” 
property worth more than $5,000 as one of the criminal acts it reaches.178  However, it is 
uncertain whether that use of fraud is as broad as the honest services concept of fraud that 
Congress, following the lead of lower courts, has explicitly written into the mail fraud 
statute.  Let us focus on the constitutional bases and rationales for a national anti-
corruption statute, recognizing that the “protection of federal funds” argument relied on 
in Sabri has limits and also suffers from being somewhat pretextual.  If Congress is now 
free to adopt a general statute, why not rely on constitutionally-based authority to do so?   
 A. Mail Fraud 
 An initial argument that must be dealt with is that Congress has already done so 
through the enactment of the mail fraud statute and its specific amendment in 1988.  Prior 
to that amendment, the statute (as well as the wire fraud statute)179 made it a crime for 
persons with a scheme to defraud or to obtain money or property by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses to, “for the purpose of executing such scheme,” place in the mails 
anything that the Postal Service would deliver.180  The natural reading of the statute is 
that one should not utilize the Postal Service for the purpose of carrying out fraud, such 
as a false solicitation for worthless land.  The lower courts had, however, construed the 
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concept of “defraud” broadly to include deprivations of the citizens’ right of honest 
services.181  In 1988, in response to a Supreme Court decision calling a halt to this 
development, Congress passed a statute which provides in part that “the term ‘scheme or 
artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right 
of honest services.”182  Not surprisingly, an extraordinary range of corrupt practices, 
including but not limited to, various forms of bribery and failure to disclose breaches of 
fiduciary duty have been construed to fit within the concept of honest services.  For 
example, in United States v. Lopez-Lukis,183 the Eleventh Circuit held that a deprivation 
of honest services occurred when a local legislator sold not only her vote but also her 
influence in delivering a majority of the board on which she served.  The court cautioned 
against any reading of the statute that would “impermissibly narrow the scope [of the 
honest services amendment] and ‘would belie a clear congressional intent to construe the 
mail fraud statute broadly.’” 184  
 There is, then, little doubt as to the scope of conduct embraced by the mail fraud 
statute, but there is considerable doubt as to whether it can, or should, serve as a general 
anti-corruption statute.  After all, both the statute and the Constitution require some 
connection to the mails.  In the seminal case of Shmuck v. United States,185 the Supreme 
Court had appeared to take a loose approach to any requirement that the mails be a direct 
part of the scheme.  The case involved selling cars with altered odometers.  The mailing 
that triggered the statute was from the dealers who purchased cars from the defendant to 
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the State Department of Transportation.  The Department required a title-application form 
for the dealers’ customers.  Despite precedent pointing in the other direction, the Court 
found these mailings, though not made by the defendant, to be “an essential step in the 
successful passage of title to the retail purchases.”186  Shmuck was a highly contested 
five-to-four decision, in which the four dissenters cautioned that “the law does not 
establish a general federal remedy against fraudulent conduct, with use of the mails as the 
jurisdictional hook, but reaches only ‘those limited instances in which the use of the 
mails, is a part of the execution of the fraud, leaving all other cases to be dealt with by 
appropriate state law.’” 187  Beyond statutory problems, it is hard to see any relationship 
between the mailings in Schmuck and the integrity of the mails or protection of the 
system. This is a constitutional problem.  It is the existence of such a relationship that ties 
the statute to the Postal Power.188  There may be a trend in the lower courts to distinguish 
Shmuck, almost to the point of distinguishing it away, and to focus on the earlier Supreme 
Court cases that emphasized the relationship of the mailing to the fraudulent scheme.  
Courts of Appeals have applied this more stringent test in both ordinary fraud cases and 
public corruption, honest services cases.189  We thus return to the concerns voiced by 
Professor Kurland that the requirement of meeting jurisdictional elements can, indeed, be 
a significant barrier to the mail fraud’s statute acting as a general anti-corruption law.190  
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Perhaps there really does have to be a mailing somewhere in the case that is connected to 
the fraud.   
 B. Corruption as Commerce  
 Over the years, Congress has used the Commerce Clause to regulate a wide 
variety of subjects.191  It may be that the Clause justifies a broad anti-corruption statute as 
fitting comfortably within existing Supreme Court precedents, even those establishing 
limits, such as Lopez and Morrison.  Indeed, Justice Thomas concurred in Sabri on the 
ground that upholding §666 was justified by existing Commerce Clause precedent.192  
One way of reaching this approach would be to take an extremely broad view of 
commerce, drawing on the work of academics such as Professor Rose-Ackerman.  In this 
view, the public and private sectors are part of a larger economy, in which different 
methods are used for the distribution of goods and services.  Just as Congress can 
regulate the private market, a proposition with solid roots in cases such as Wickard v. 
Filburn,193 so can it regulate the public sector market in goods and services as part of its 
overall power.  Such a broad concept of the realm of commerce/economic power has 
considerable theoretical appeal, but may go beyond what either Congress or the Court is 
willing to consider as that part of the economy that Congress can regulate.  It would seem 
to permit regulation of municipal fees and taxes, for example. 
 Let us consider a somewhat more narrow, but still encompassing approach.  That 
is the notion that consensual corrupt transactions are a form of payment for government 
services that Congress can potentially regulate just as it can potentially regulate other 
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forms of consensual economic transactions.  As Professor Henning puts it, in the context 
of the Hobbs Act, “extortion under color of official right. . . involves a quid pro quo 
exchange of something of value for the exercise—or non-exercise—of governmental 
power.  The corrupt transaction is fundamentally an economic one in which the official 
seeks to benefit personally from the misuse of authority.”194  It is instructive that, in 
Sabri, Justice Thomas cited Perez v. United States,195 in which the Court upheld 
regulation of loan-sharking on the grounds that it was an extortionate credit transaction.  
An advantage of a Commerce Clause-based anti-corruption statute is that it would seem 
to dispense with any problems of requiring a showing of an effect on commerce in the 
particular case, or any other form of jurisdictional requirement such as the receipt of 
more than $10,000 in federal assistance in §666.  Perez is relevant here as well.  It is 
possible to aggregate similar commercial transactions to reach the level of a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce regardless of the magnitude of any particular one.196   
 Nonetheless, there may be problems with the Commerce Clause approach to a 
general anti-corruption statute.  Non-transactional forms of corruption may not be easily 
reached.  The Perez analogy may also be flawed in the sense that that case seemed to rest 
on the proposition that Congress could reach the legal market in credit transactions.  
Therefore, it could reach the illegal market in extortionate credit transactions.  As 
discussed above, there is doubt whether Congress could regulate, for example, fees 
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resources.”  Id. 
195 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971). 
196 The classic aggregation case remains Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).  For a discussion of 
aggregation versus jurisdictional elements, see Brown, Constitutionalizing, supra note 37, at 1109-17. 
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charged by municipalities for building permits.  There are also lingering doubts about 
possible limits flowing from Lopez and its heightened concern for federalism when the 
Commerce Clause is used for regulation of matters far outside the classic view of the 
economy that Justice Thomas advanced, albeit alone, in that case.197  Finally, it is worth 
noting that Congress has never adopted an all-encompassing view of commerce as 
justifying anti-corruption legislation.  Rather, it has relied on jurisdictional elements 
requiring an effect on commerce in the individual case or use of a channel of interstate 
commerce such as travel.198 
 C. Corruption as a Civil Rights Problem—a Possible Role for the Fourteenth 
Amendment   
 
 
                                                
Corruption, especially in a local government, can be viewed as a form of 
deprivation of civil rights.199  Corruption often leads to a skewing in the provision of 
goods and services, frequently to the detriment of minority communities.  In addition, 
local corruption is often the product of political entrenchment.  Again, there is the 
possibility that discrete and insular groups will suffer harm at the hands of “their 
government.”  Any such analysis suggests the possibility of a role for the Fourteenth 
Amendment.200  That Amendment is aimed at protecting minorities, and has always been 
recognized by the Court as altering the federal-state balance.201  Moreover, it contains an 
explicit authorization to Congress to enact “appropriate” legislation, thus putting it on a 
 
197 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584-602 (Thomas, J., concurring).  Justice Thomas stated, “Clearly, the Framers 
could have drafted a Constitution that contains a ‘substantially affects interstate commerce’ Clause had that 
been their objective.”  Id. at 588.  He also stated that “In an appropriate case, I believe that we must further 
reconsider our ‘substantial effects’ test with an eye toward constructing a standard that reflects the text and 
history of the Commerce Clause without totally rejecting our more recent Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence.”  Id. at 585. 
198 E.g., The Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2000). 
199 For a discussion of the civil rights rationale, see Brown, Unanswered Question, supra note 6, at 489-91. 
200 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
201 E.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
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par with the enumerated powers of §1.202  (The fact that the Guarantee Clause contains no 
such authorization may be an additional problem in viewing it as a possible source of 
anti-corruption legislation).   
 There are, however, obvious problems, especially given current Fourteenth 
Amendment doctrine.  The Amendment clearly contemplates, or establishes the existence 
of, rights of which states may not deprive their citizens.203  The Constitution does not 
explicitly provide a right to good government.  The major current battle within 
Fourteenth Amendment doctrine is the extent to which Congress can create statutory 
rights to supplement those that can be found in the Constitution.204  The Court has 
affirmed that federalism plays a role in evaluating legislation based on the amendment.  It 
has apparently focused on a test which requires the core existence of a constitutional 
right, a widespread degree of state violation of that right, and remedial mechanisms 
which are “congruent” and “proportional” to the deprivation.205  A case can be made that 
corruption fits this model, but it is not an easy one.  The argument starts from the fact that 
certain forms of corruption implicate constitutional rights.  Patronage practices can 
constitute First Amendment violations.206  Deprivations of due process might be found in 
                                                 
202 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
203 In this respect, the key language of the Amendment is that providing that “no State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Id. at § 1. 
204 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
205 See id. at 519-20.  In City of Boerne, Justice Kennedy stated that “While the line between measures that 
remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substantive change in the governing 
law is not easy to discern, and Congress must have wide latitude in determining where it lies, the 
distinction exists and must be observed. There must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury 
to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end. Lacking such a connection, legislation may 
become substantive in operation and effect.”  Id. 
206 E.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976). 
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some cases.207  Certainly Congress would be justified in taking the additional step of 
concluding that corruption is widespread in states and localities.  However, it is doubtful 
that a broad-based anti-corruption statute would satisfy current notions of congruence and 
proportionality.  This is probably a discussion that can be left for another day, but it does 
highlight the importance of being able to rely on a constitutional provision that 
contemplates federal intervention in state affairs to achieve a broad national goal.  If one 
of the lessons of the 2003 Term is that corruption trumps federalism, then the Fourteenth 
Amendment rationale may well prove worth reexamination.   
 D. The Spending Power Revisited 
 Perhaps one may justify §666, and an even broader anti-corruption statute, on 
Spending Power grounds different from those set forth in Sabri.  As stated previously in 
this article, why not let Congress say that its objective is to prevent corruption rather than 
hide behind the protection of federal funds?  An alternative approach to outlawing 
corruption in entities, governmental or not, receiving federal funds would be based on the 
work of scholars such as Professor Hills who view the system of substantial federal aid to 
governments as creating an “intergovernmental marketplace” in which the national 
government enlists states, localities and other entities as partners in the provision of 
goods and services.208  As Professor Hills puts it “there is a vigorous intergovernmental 
marketplace in which municipalities, counties, and states—like private organizations and 
persons—compete with each other for the chance to obtain federal revenue.  Therefore, 
                                                 
207 See ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 7, at 555-60 (citing and discussing possible examples of corruption 
as deprivations of federal rights); see also Brown, Unanswered Question, supra note 6, at 486-87 
(discussing equality issues).  This analysis does not discuss the possibility of corruption issues in “class of 
one” cases.   
208 See generally, Roderick M. Hills, The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State 
Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813 (1998). 
52 
whenever the national government values such services enough to pay nonfederal 
governments the costs of providing them, the national government can obtain the 
cooperation of state or local governments in implementing federal law.”209  Thus it might 
follow that the federal government has the power to establish the “rules of the game,” 
perhaps to achieve greater efficiency, perhaps to ensure that the complex set of 
partnerships it has created is run according to national values.210  In theory, the presence 
of choice—the possibility of opting out—justifies the imposition of requirements on 
recipients including a criminal provision such as §666.  It is not a condition for any 
specific grant, but it is a general rule applicable to the entire system.  Perhaps there is less 
choice, since a recipient would have to opt out of the entire system, rather than any 
particular grant, to avoid the statute:  I do not mean to impute support for this approach to 
Professor Hills.  (He has noted, for example, that the federal interests in protecting the 
integrity of the mails or of federal grants can easily turn into “sheer formalities.”211  
Perhaps the same thing would happen to the “rules of the intergovernmental system” 
rationale.)  One would have to think through the implications of any such rationale.  
Perhaps it would take us too far—to the point feared by Professor Garnett where the view 
prevails that Congress can spend for the general welfare and can then adopt any law that 
is necessary and proper to further the general welfare.212  I recognize the problem of 
limits.  The challenge for the nationalist perspective is to lay the basis for a general anti-
corruption statute without reaching into all aspects of state and local governments.  If the 
Spending Power is to be used to support a general anti-corruption statute, the challenge is 
                                                 
209 Id. at 819. 
210 These might be the values the Professor Hills has characterized as “bureaucratic populism.”  Hills, 
Corruption, supra note 48, at 13. 
211 Id. at n.75. 
212 Garnett, supra note 78, at 82. 
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both to justify that role openly and to keep alive the prospect of some limits.  Perhaps 
“protecting federal funds” serves these ends as well as any alternative rationale.  At the 
very least, however, it must be recognized that there are cases of corruption in which that 
end is simply not served.   
Conclusion 
During the 2003 Term, the Supreme Court issued two important decisions aimed 
at keeping corruption out of government:  McConnell v. FEC and Sabri v. United States.  
McConnell got all the publicity, but Sabri is just as significant.  It not only validated a 
sweeping reading of the federal program bribery statute (18 U.S.C. §666), Sabri focused 
on protecting the integrity of state and local governments as the means of protecting 
federal funds.  The case thus stands as an affirmation of the federal role in prosecuting 
state and local officials for political corruption. 
 In this Article, I have raised the recurring question whether the prosecutions are 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s New Federalism.  A strong argument can be made 
that they are not, but the Court has established that its anti-corruption imperative trumps 
federalism.  If Sabri represents a victory for the nationalist view on corruption 
prosecution, the question remains whether the Spending Power—coupled with the notion 
of protecting federal funds—is the best route to get there.  There are alternative 
constitutional and statutory possibilities for a general anti-corruption statute.  Sabri’s 
greatest strength may be that it takes us to the point where we can deal with the matter 
openly. 
